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Tactical Transme with a Purpose

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The combined arms concept governs the way the U.S. Army is training to fight the AirLand Battle. It is discussed at great length during service school courses and in gameboard simulations. But before soldiers and small-unit leaders can get a real appreciation for combined arms and gain an ability to use the concept, they must be allowed to apply it in a realistic situation. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry conducted a successful combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX) at Fort Riley in 1982, and a summary of the battalion's experiences may provide a "how to do it" for other units.

This CALFEX focused on three rifle companies, each of which conducted a 48-hour exercise. The battalion conducted the entire exercise in five days, as shown in Table 1. Elements of the combat support company were attached to the company teams

or otherwise supported their operations. Command and control was furnished by the battalion tactical operations center in the field, and support to each team was provided from the battalion trains. The CALFEX gave the battalion's soldiers and leaders alike an opportunity to see the effects of combined arms operations, and it also gave the leaders an opportunity to plan and control combined arms assets in a live fire exercise.

Organizing and coordinating the CALFEX was complex and demanding. In fact, the event was planned as a graduation exercise for which the units would have to train.

All the battalion assets were used, and the battalion coordinated with a large number of outside organizations. Battalion planners, for example, began their coordination with the air elements for close air support and

attack helicopters 120 days before the scheduled event. The times and number of sorties, together with the types of desired ordnance for each sortie, were confirmed.

Coordinating a firing battery and the necessary ammunition was only one part of the field artillery support. The fire support team (FIST) for each company and the battalion fire support element (FSE) had to become fully involved in the planning phase of the exercise, and they also participated in the preliminary training before the actual exercise.

Before the exercise, too, combat engineers were used to prepare obstacles in the maneuver area. The materials the engineers needed had to be anticipated and obtained and the equipment requested. Like the artillerymen, the engineers were integrated into all pre-CALFEX training. Sup-

MON	Tue	ALFEX Schedule WED	THU.	FRI
Co A Tactical move Occupy TAA	Dry attack Live atk/def Delay Occupy TAA	Shakedown Tactical nove Recovery		
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	The control of the co	Table 1	Occupy ,TAA	Single in the second of the se

porting armor platoons also trained in their designated mechanized intantry companies during the pre-CALFEX period.

In addition to these combined arms elements, several post agencies were involved in the coordination process. Range control, for instance, played an apportant part in the planning, because range and training area requirements, including pre-training requirements, had to be arranged for and confirmed. Extensive range preparation was also required; the objective had to be prepared, hard targets emplaced, and range fans drawn and approved.

Class III and V supplies for all participating units also had to be coordinated during the planning phase. The coordination of Class V supplies was a key area. A large draw and turn-in had to be anticipated and scheduled by both the supply and transportation platoon and the ammunition supply point (ASP). Class V needs also had to be coordinated between all of the supporting units and the ASP (See Table 2).

The presence of controllers and

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Ammunition Ex	pended.
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455WP	18 × 18
155.Smoke 7	18
100 HEAT/TPT	60
20mm Cannon 2	1,020
2,75 inch Rocket	· · · · 300
Semm Subcaliber	42
Donagrot include USA	Fordnance.)
Table	2

Sequence of Events

	P	e Maria (1. A.)
Time	Event	<u>Task No.</u>
Dây 1		
0800	Prepare for Operations	3-1-1 3-1-2
	Receive Bn TF OPORD Prepare & Inspect Equipment	3-1-6
1000	Issue Team OPORD Conduct Tactical Roadmarch	3-V-1-1 3-V-1-3
1300	Operate Quartering Party	3-V-1-4
	Cróss SP Maintaín Security	3-V-1-6 3-V-1-7
	Operate Trail Party	3 V-1-8 3 I-1
1500	Occupy Assembly Area Prepare for Operations	3-1-2-1
	ARP	
Day2		
B SHIP		and the state of t
0001	Prepare for Operations	39-1 39-2
0900		3-V-2-5 3-V-1 thru 11
0930	Team Attack, Cross LD	3-V-2-4, 5
1000	Move to Objective (Dry Fire) Mounted Assault of Objective	7, 10, 11 3-V-2-13
	Consolidate	3-V-2-16 3-V-2-17
1045	Reorganize AAR of Dry Fire	
1100	Test Fire of Weapons Withdraw to Assembly Area	
1215		3 [-1, 2, 6
1400	Same tasks as 0900-1045. The exercise will be	3.V.1161644
	conducted as a live-fire exercise.	
1645		3-V-3-2
	Preparation of Battle Position React to Indirect Fire	3-V-3-3 3-V-3-5
	React to Direct Fire	3-V-3-6 3-V-3-7
1 9 3	Eriemy Probe, Attack Employ Supporting Fire	3-V-3-14
2100	Clear - Inspect all Weapons	
2130	Turn in Ammunition AAR	and an arrangement of the second
2200	Withdraw to Assembly Area	
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Day 3		
0700	Preparation for Operations	3-1-1
1000	Inspection of Equipment (Final Shakedown) Conduct Tactical Roadmarch	3-I-6 3-V-1-3
	Sept. Total Sept.	
	Table 3	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

evaluators down to platoon level was critical to the success of the exercise. The evaluators provided immediate feedback in the form of after-action reviews, which were scheduled as training events during the exercise, as shown in Table 3.

The soldiers and leaders were given specific preliminary training in the skills they would need to execute the CALFEX. This preliminary training ensured that in the CALFEX itself the soldiers could apply acquired skills instead of being forced to learn and apply new skills at the same time.

Before the exercise itself, the soldiers were trained in the Soldier's Manual skills outlined in ARTEP 71-2 in the Individual/Collective Integration Matrix. The batallion placed special emphasis on individual and crewserved weapon proficiency.

Squad, platoon, and company ARTEP task training, which focused on the tasks selected for the CALFEX, was also conducted. Leader training emphasized the application of combined arms assets through the use of TEWTs, map exercises, and classroom training. The TEWTs were conducted on two levels. The first, conducted by the battalion commander, included the rifle company commanders, the armor company commander, the engineers, the U.S. Air Force forward air controller, and the Army air controllers. The second level of TEWTs, conducted by each rifle company commander with platoon and squad leaders from their companies and leaders from their attachments, consisted of multiple exercises. All of these TEWTs were conducted both on the ground and from the air. Dry runs of the CALFEX were conducted before the exercise and also as an event during the exercise itself.

The value of all this advance coordination, planning, and training became clear during the actual com-

bined arms exercise. Each company team followed the sequence of events shown in Table 3, and the controllers evaluated the ARTEP tasks as the events progressed.

Safety was a key factor, and all safety officer requirements were met by the chain of command during the exercise. A series of well-defined phase lines were used both for safety and for realism. The crossing of phase lines determined when the tactical air support would start and stop, when the indirect fire would be shifted, and when weapons would be loaded. Thus, the maneuver elements did not encounter any dangerous fire. Only the enemy force was simulated, and the units in the exercise accepted all tactical limitations in exchange for the training value to be derived from them.

At the conclusion of each major phase of the operation, an immediate after-action review was conducted for the leaders and soldiers at all levels. These reviews were positive and were conducted in such a way as to maintain the momentum of the problem; no "administrative halts" were called for the purpose of conducting reviews.

LESSONS LEARNED

The CALFEX, as it was conducted by the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, proved to be a valuable exercise in terms of the amount of realistic training the soldiers and their leaders received. A number of valuable lessons were learned during the planning and execution of the exercise, and these lessons should be applied to all similar exercises:

• All agencies and assets from both the installation and the division must be properly coordinated and used to gain the full value from the many resources that must be committed to a CALFEX.



- The coordination of range construction and target emplacement must be centralized at division level.
- Qualified evaluators from outside a battalion would allow all of the battalion's soldiers to focus their full attention on their tactical assignments.
- Even more preliminary live-fire training would be helpful. (Ideally, squad and platoon live-fire exercises should be conducted before the CALFEX; they would help to instill into soldiers and leaders alike a greater degree of confidence and skill in their ability to handle weapons and systems in a live-fire situation.)

The battalion's CALFEX was expensive in terms of both manpower and material, but the training value derived from it made it well worth the cost. The chain of command of each company was clearly identified and validated. The soldiers gained an appreciation for the firepower available in a combined arms team, and the leaders enjoyed a rare opportunity to apply and control the key elements of a combined arms team in a realistic situation. This training experience clearly improved this battalion's ability to fight the AirLand Battle on the next battlefield.



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